Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).
Response 
Introduction
The goal of the organizations that provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is to reduce suffering and fatalities. Estimating the quantity and type of demand is difficult, but what is even more difficult is assessing .where and when the relief is needed (Apte, 2009 ). However, providing relief depends on the speed of the response, and matching the supply with the need assessed (Apte, 2014) . This is often a function of the capabilities and competencies of the organizations (Apte & Yoho, 2011a) .
The maritime strategy outlined in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states that the USN will focus on partnerships with all the key players in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) to safeguard United States'interests. The USN has made significant contributions toward HADR. Though this is possible due to the USN's many unique and critical capabilities, in the past, not all of the USN's efforts have been as efficient and effective as they could have been.
There is plenty of evidence that proves the USN's willingness to provide assets in disaster relief efforts. However, there has always been a need to perform HADR smartly and economically. It will be even more important in the future when budget reductions and uncertainty are likely to be the norm. Therefore, given the substantial costs incurred, the important question is whether the USN deploys or diverts the right ships for HADR. The experience off the coast of Bangladesh suggests that sometimes, it does not (Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, & Ingram, 2013) . This research develops a mathematical model to optimize the deployment of USN assets during HADR operations (Apte et al., 2013) . U.S. forces have been diverted from original missions 366 times for humanitarian assistance as opposed to 22 times for combat from 1979 to 2000, according to the fact sheets of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Center for Naval Analysis, as shown in Figure 1 . If the ships sent are not capable of handling the humanitarian operations, the quick deployment of such ships does not serve the objective of delivering relief. For this purpose, it is necessary that we understand which vessels contribute what capability for HADR.
Figure 1. USN Ships Diverted for Humanitarian Operations
The vessels that the USN deployed for HADR in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were the entire Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG), which included two fast attack submarines (SSN) and two Flight I DDGs. During the response efforts following Hurricane Katrina, the USN sent nine Minesweepers. In 2007, in order to help Bangladesh with the Category 5 cyclone, Sidr, the ship that was diverted to help was the USS Hopper (DDG 70). Based on platform capabilities (Apte et al., 2013) , some of these vessels did not play a substantial role in the relief process, yet they were tasked with these missions without accounting for their existing capabilities. Apte et al. (2013) investigated and identified the capabilities of USN vessels deployed to meet the HADR mission requests. The different platforms of the ship classes were studied and their HADR-related characteristics analyzed to find the relative utility of each vessel type using ordinally scaled expert ratings. The experts were USN surface warfare officers. We studied every ship that was deployed to respond to certain disasters. Apte et al. (2013) Affairs, 2007; Plyer, 2013; Wooldridge, 2010) . In addition, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan also prompted significant support from the USN (Kaczur, Aurelio, & Joloya, 2012 (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011; Kaczur et al., 2012) Table 2 shows the categories of the ships sent. The ship platforms referred to in this research are those that have been deployed or diverted for HADR in the past. Their descriptions are given in Appendix A. (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011; Kaczur et al., 2012) We developed an optimization model based on the parameterized rating system (Apte et al., 2013) for selecting the optimal assets of the USN. Such methodology can provide an optimal mix of the ships that should be sent for HADR based on available supply, demand, and capabilities through a portfolio of vessels in terms of best composition for the future force structure.
Table 2. Categories of the Ships in USN Response
The article is organized as follows: The next section describes the problem and the parameters used in addition to developing and defining the model. In the section following, we provide the results of this computational experiment followed by the discussion section. Finally, we offer our conclusions in the last section
The Problem
Before we propose the model of our current research, we first need to understand the demand due to disaster traits and relief requirements and, on the supply side, mission requirements and capabilities for those missions of the ships. Figure 2 describes the conceptual model on which we anchor our methodology (Apte et al., 2013) . In the process of studying various disasters in our exploration of the topic of HADR, we have identified certain disaster traits that lead to specific relief requirements. (Apte et al., 2013) The capabilities of the ships to be deployed or diverted have been evaluated for a given relief requirement (Apte et al., 2013) . Some capabilities are critical and some, though beneficial for the relief, are not critical. For example, one obvious relief requirement-the need for medical supplies, water, and food to be delivered-calls for a ship with the critical capability of lift capacity. Whereas, population dispersion requires search and rescue and personal transfer capabilities. Figure 3 depicts the interaction between Disaster Traits and Relief Requirements. This is not an exhaustive list by any means, but we want to show the underpinnings of the development of the optimization model. On the supply side, the ships diverted or deployed must have the ability to satisfy the relief requirement. A ship's capability to conduct a certain HADR mission set is derived from the vessel's characteristics. The USN has many types of vessels with different capabilities. When a request for mission is received, a mission request process is generated by the officers of the Navy. There are different types of missions that operational commanders may be requested to conduct based on the capabilities of the ship. For example, aircraft support and freshwater production are some of the capabilities a ship may need to have to fulfill the mission request. Table 3 . Critical and Non-Critical Mission Capabilities (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) The Environment
Figure 2. Conceptual Model
Our problem posits a potential disaster in a littoral environment. The problem for the discussed scenario uses previous disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, 2010 Haiti earthquake, and 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami with the corresponding responses provided by the USN. Based on the extent of destruction and casualties, the affected host country (AHC) has requested HADR from the United States. While the State Department is ultimately responsible for the United States' response to such requests they do not have the means to conduct HADR operations, but have the budget for HADR. Our notional costs are derived based on budget and the funding model of the State Department (Ures, 2011; Herbert, Wharton, & Prosser, 2012) and input from the subject matter experts. The USN is the leading organization in fulfilling the gap between who should and who can provide HADR. Given this history, in our scenario, the USN is getting ready to deploy and/or divert certain vessels to the affected country. Grounded in the previous experience and available analysis of the capabilities of the fleets (Apte et al., 2013) , we developed the optimization model to decide what optimal mix of ships should be deployed to respond to this disaster.
A Notional Scenario
The AHC has suffered devastation due to high winds, torrential rains, and flood. There are many casualties and many more are injured, displaced, or missing. Due to landslides, buildings, such as hospitals, some administrative buildings, and Table 4 describes a plausible set of demands for capabilities that are needed in the AHC.
Table 4. Demands for the baseline model
These are the demands on the notional scenario defined in the problem for the AHC. The demands are units of demand on a relative scale. The capabilities that can provide the relief needed are given in Table 5 (1) subject to
Objective function (1) minimizes the cost of a ship i across all the capabilities j J  summed over all ships i I  , thus yielding the total cost. Constraints (2) ensure that demand for capability j J  is met by the flotilla of the ships that are deployed and/or diverted to the AHC. Constraints (3) guarantee that fractional ships are not deployed or diverted.
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó -10 -k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
The Results
We solved the optimization model using Microsoft Excel Solver. Results of the baseline model using plausible yet notional data based on previously collected information for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011; Ures, 2011) , and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan (Kaczur et al., 2012; Herbert et al., 2012) are given in Table 7 . Since the accessible data only gave the functional cost for all the ships together, i j c the cost of functional capability j J  of ship i I  had to be assumed to be the same across the ships.
The baseline model offered one perspective-namely, which ships will be used if all costs were the same by focusing on capabilities alone as opposed to the cost of the capabilities. However, not all ships cost the same when deployed or diverted. The costs depend on many factors such as the ships' size , whether they are built to commercial standards, and whether they travel with support or sail alone.
Table 7. Results of the baseline model for deployment or diversion of ships to AHC
In order to incorporate this limitation of the baseline model, we conducted sensitivity analysis by exploring the model further and focusing on the relative ranking of the cost of the ship itself with everything else being equal. The motivation was the same as before −to discover which ships show up in the optimal mix. Assuming that all ships are ready to be deployed and are travelling from same point A to same point B, and maintaining the same demands, we ran the model with ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó -11 -k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä= different rankings of the ship costs based on different subject matter experts. We gave higher rank to ships with higher cost. Thus the rank of the ship is the surrogate for its relative cost of deployment (and does not account for diverted ships). We understand that this is a limitation but it has its own advantage of evaluating ships based on deployment alone. We believe it adds to the set of data points for making an informed decision. The total cost is representative of the cost and not the actual cost. But it is descriptive of the cost incurred as the ranks are varied. The results of this computational experiment are given in Table 8 .
Table 8. Results with Different Rank of Costs
In order to explore how demands affect the optimal mix of the ships, in addition to the notional scenario, we also varied demands maintaining the same rank of cost to discover which ships show up in the optimal solution often. The demands were varied based on the past disaster characteristics and the affected area. The primary motivation for this sensitivity analysis was whether the demand or the costs dictate the mix of the supply. The impetus here was to see if costs or capabilities drove the model. Table 9 describes the results of the effect, if any, of varying the demand. The demands for the disasters were derived from extensive computation of the available data and discussions with subject matter experts. The demands for the computational experiments are given in Appendix B.
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Discussion
The developed optimization model was run for a notional scenario. The baseline results show that the optimal mix of vessels included amphibious ships, PM-2, and PM-3. The critical capabilities of these platforms together provide the necessary relief.
The sensitivity analysis of the model by first changing the relative cost of the ships and then, by changing the demands based on past disasters while keeping the costs constant, yielded a set of optimal solutions. The solutions are summarized in Table 10 .
The pattern can be seen through the experiment. The ships that show up every time are amphibious ships, PM-2, and RRF. PM-1 and PM-3 show up a few times. But it is clear that the unique and critical capabilities of the amphibious ships in providing aircraft and landing craft support, search and rescue operations, berthing facilities, and transfer of personnel make them indispensable for HADR. That is most likely the reason why they show up in all the optimal solutions irrespective of relative cost or demand. Based on this result it is clear that capabilities of the ships for HADR is all that mattered in this experiment. The same can be said about PM-2 with its unique capability for salvage operations and RRF for its cargo space for dry and refrigerated goods, fresh water, and fuel. What is also important to note is which ships did not show up even a single time in all these solutions. One has to keep in mind that we carried out the computational experiment for only the deployed ships. Of interest, the ships that never showed up were the nuclear carriers, crudes, and LCSs.
It should also be noted that in investigating the binding constraint of all the versions of the model, we uncovered that demands for aircraft support, roll on and roll off capability, and salvage operations were exactly satisfied, indicating that these demands were critically satisfied with no surplus, whereas demand for fresh water, fuel, and berthing capacity were overly satisfied. However, when it comes to HADR, this is a good thing.
Conclusion
We conducted a computational experiment by developing an optimization model to find out which USN platforms are critical and hence most effective and efficient for HADR. Our conclusions were that amphibious, PM-2, and RRF ships are the most capable ships for humanitarian operations. On the other hand, nuclear carriers, crudes, and LCSs are not. We have to point out that there were certain assumptions made to look at the bigger picture. Availability of data or lack thereof was also a limiting factor.
In the future research it would benefit the analysis further if the model is run with real, relevant, and appropriate data. We are currently exploring venues for this purpose. An aircraft carrier is a warship with a full-length flight deck and facilities for carrying, arming, deploying, and recovering aircraft, that serves as a seagoing airbase. A nuclear carrier is powered by nuclear power.
The Amphibious ships have the ability to move swiftly through water and over land. They operate year-round, handling power projection and beach assault, as well as assisting in crisis response, humanitarian operations and disaster relief.
Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates make certain no carrier, cargo/supply ship or oil tanker proceeds into an area where enemy action is possible. With lightning-quick communications, space-based radar systems, precision weapons and advanced engineering systems, these agile surface warfare ships provide anti-aircraft, antisubmarine and anti-ship protective measures.
Littoral combat ships, patrol craft, and mine countermeasures ships.
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